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Two considerations are provided: first, he argues that our perceptual experience can (and sometimes does) influence the reliability of our cognitive capacities — including the capacities that are run offline when we engage in mental simulation. Derivatively, it can affect the reliability with which our simulation-based judgements are produced. This is not yet enough for experience to play a strictly evidential role (in the formation of these judgements). But it makes for more than a purely enabling role, since reliability is epistemically relevant — according to Williamson, it is essential to both knowledge and justification. 94 The possibility of this ‘intermediate’ role for experience is illustrated with a case in which a subject arrives at the judgement that if two marks had been nine inches apart, they would have been at least nineteen centimeters apart , by running her capacity to make ‘naked eye judgements’ of distances in inches and centimetres offline. (She does not know the conversion ratio.) And that capacity is supposed to depend for its reliability — both online and offline — on her past perceptual experience (see Williamson 2007b , pp. 165–6).

The judgement in the example is a counterfactual judgement, but it is clear that a judgement with a similar causal history and a different content (e.g. the corresponding indicative, material, or strict conditional) would have served equally well: it is the fact that the judgement is simulation-based — not that it has a counterfactual content — that does the work in the example. 95 This does not yet show that the capacity to handle counterfactuals is idle in the argument since, for Williamson, that capacity just is a capacity for mental simulation. However, the example, on its own, does not take us very far: the hard work lies in showing that experience plays the specified intermediate role in a critical mass of cases. And that is by no means obvious. In particular, it is not obvious that it plays that role relative to any judgements that are prima facie candidates for being a priori justified — not even relative to any (in the present context) controversial candidates, such as the Gettier judgement. 96

It is at this point that Williamson resorts to perfectly general considerations. A few judgements with a prima facie claim to a priority — including the Gettier judgement, the judgement that it is necessary that whoever knows something believes it, and the judgement that whoever knew something believed it — are explicitly assimilated to the comparative distance judgement in the central example ( Williamson 2007b , pp. 168, 188). But he does not explain why we should think that the prima facie a priori judgements, like the comparative distance judgement, are based on the offline use of a capacity that crucially depends on perceptual experience for its reliability. Instead he outlines, and rejects, a number of specific positive accounts of the epistemology of these judgements — ‘traditional’ accounts, on which experience either plays a strictly evidential, or a purely enabling, role. The upshot is supposed to be that there is no plausible account of either sort available. (To say that, of course, is just to say that there is no plausible account available on which the judgements come out a posteriori, and a priori, respectively.)

So, what exactly is framing? It is a process where one site doesn’t display only another site’s video or photograph (as happens with embedding), but displays the entirety of that third-party site. Generally, when you surf on over to a particular website, you are seeing a display that results from the data that that website proprietor created and stored on its computer. But, if the website proprietor wants to engage in some legal hijinks, it can write code that directs your computer, upon visiting its site, to display content from someone else’s website as if were the proprietor’s. So, when you punch in www.kwazycontent.com and are surprised when the page loads and you see within that site’s display the splash page from CNN or National Geographic or wherever — you’ve been framed.

The technique, which includes directing viewers’ browsers to view third-party content, is wildly illegal for rather lucid reasons. As Judge Boyle deftly noted, the process engaged in by the infringer “impermissibly displayed the works to the public[]” in violation of Section 106(5) of the Copyright Act. In doing so, the infringer, who wanted for its own reasons to post the creator’s content, which consisted of material about bikes and team-building and where the twain meet, “displayed [the creator’s] content as if it were its own.” Thus, infringement.

In defense, and per what is becoming a tired routine, the infringers booted up Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc ., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007), a favorite case amongst copyright infringers. It is so favored due to now archaic language that infringers argue makes “actual possession of a copy a necessary condition to violating a copyright owner’s exclusive right to display her copyrighted work.” Judge Boyle states expressly that she would disagree with this proposition if it is a proposition at all.

In the end, the court kicks the framing argument to the curb, noting that the Copyright Act makes it clear that “to display a work publicly, a person need only transmit or communicate a display to the public.” And, framed or not, a website’s post of third-party content is most certainly a display to the public.

Scott Alan Burroughs, Esq. practices with Doniger / Burroughs , an art law firm based in Venice, California. He represents artists and content creators of all stripes and writes and speaks regularly on copyright issues. He can be reached at scott@copyrightLA.com , and you can follow his law firm on Instagram: @veniceartlaw .

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Volume 120
Issue 478
April 2011
Article Contents
Abstract
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Anna-Sara Malmgren
University of Texas at Austin annasara@austin.utexas.edu
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, Volume 120, Issue 478, 1 April 2011, Pages 263–327, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr039
Published:
11 August 2011
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Anna-Sara Malmgren; Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements, Mind , Volume 120, Issue 478, 1 April 2011, Pages 263–327, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr039

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Abstract

It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. I argue that the psychological claim — that a capacity for mental simulation explains our intuitive judgements — does not, even if true, provide reasons to reject rationalism. (More generally, a simulation hypothesis, about any category of judgements, is very limited in its epistemological implications: it is pitched at a level of explanation that is insensitive to central epistemic distinctions.) I also argue that Williamson’s semantic claim — that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals — is mistaken; rather, I propose, they are a certain kind of metaphysical possibility judgement. Several other competing proposals are also examined and criticized.

Issue Section:

What demarcates philosophy from other academic disciplines, specifically from (other) sciences? One striking difference is that in philosophy we typically do not subject our hypotheses and theories to empirical testing — somehow it is supposed to be sufficient to test a theory in thought . Where the chemist sets up a lab experiment and the sociologist conducts a survey, the philosopher sits back and runs a thought experiment. 1 How could that be enough? Indeed, how could an experiment performed in thought tell us anything about the nature of knowledge, consciousness, time, moral value, or any of the other things that philosophers are interested in?

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